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Sperino: Retaliation and the Reasonable Person

RETALIATION AND THE REASONABLE PERSON
Sandra F. Sperino
Abstract
When a worker complains about discrimination, federal law is
supposed to protect that worker from later retaliation. Recent scholarly
attention focuses on how courts limit retaliation claims by narrowly
framing the causation inquiry. A larger threat to retaliation law is
developing in the lower courts. Courts are declaring a wide swath of
conduct as insufficiently serious to constitute retaliation.
Many courts hold that it is legal for an employer to threaten to fire a
worker, to place the worker on administrative leave, or to negatively
evaluate the worker because she complained about discriminatory
conduct. Even if the worker has evidence that her complaint caused the
negative consequence, some judges refuse to call the employer’s conduct
legal retaliation.
This growing body of retaliation harm jurisprudence is surprising.
Under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a worker suffers an
adverse action if the negative consequence would dissuade a reasonable
person from complaining about discrimination. Yet, lower courts
routinely dismiss cases by ruling that consequences such as threatened
termination or negative evaluations would not dissuade a reasonable
person from filing a discrimination complaint.
In doing so, courts are making factual determinations about what
reasonable people think. Using empirical evidence, this Article
demonstrates that these factual determinations are incorrect. This Article
then explores how structural and substantive features of retaliation law
and judicial decision-making skew retaliation law in a narrow direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal employment discrimination law relies on worker complaints
for its enforcement. The law requires workers to report discrimination to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a state
agency before filing suit.1 Court-created doctrines also require or
encourage employees to complain about inappropriate discriminatory
conduct.2
The discrimination statutes ostensibly protect workers through antiretaliation provisions.3 To prevail on a retaliation claim, a person must
show that she engaged in protected activity, that she suffered an adverse
action, and that there was a causal connection between the activity and

1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1) (2012).
2. See infra Section V.B.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012); Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012).
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the consequence.4 Recent scholarly attention focuses on how courts limit
retaliation claims by narrowly framing the causation inquiry.5 A larger
threat to retaliation law is developing in the lower courts. Courts are
declaring a wide swath of conduct as insufficiently serious to constitute
retaliation.
If an employer threatens to fire an employee, places her on
administrative leave, or gives her a bad evaluation because she
complained about discriminatory conduct, many courts will dismiss the
employee’s retaliation claim.6 Even if the employee has evidence that her
complaint caused the negative consequence, some courts refuse to call
such conduct legal retaliation.
This growing body of retaliation harm jurisprudence is surprising.
Under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a worker suffers an
adverse action if the negative consequence would dissuade a reasonable
person from complaining about discrimination.7 Yet, lower courts
routinely dismiss cases by ruling that certain consequences, such as
threatened termination or negative evaluations, would not dissuade a
reasonable person from filing a discrimination complaint.8
In doing so, courts are making factual determinations about what
reasonable people think. Using empirical evidence, this Article
demonstrates that these factual determinations are incorrect.9 I asked
study participants if facing certain negative consequences would dissuade
them from complaining about discrimination. An overwhelming
percentage of study participants perceived a wide range of negative
consequences as likely to deter them from complaining about
discrimination. These results held true for both men and women.
The study results demonstrate that lower courts have set the harm
threshold too high. Borrowing from past critiques of the reasonable
person standard, it is tempting to conclude that such results merely reflect
bias. However, combining an extensive review of the retaliation cases
with the study results suggests that something else is happening in the
retaliation context.
4. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013); see also Crawford
v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) (discussing
opposition and participation conduct under Title VII).
5. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning?
Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s
Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (but Should),
64 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2013).
6. See infra Part I.
7. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Brown v. SDH Educ. E. LLC, No. 3:12-cv-2961-TLW, 2014 WL 468974, at
*6–7 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014).
9. See infra Part II.
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This Article explores the role of perceived precedent in shaping
retaliation law. When courts rule that a particular action is not serious
enough to trigger retaliation liability, the resulting decision appears as if
the court is making the determination as a matter of law for all similar
actions.10 Lower courts in subsequent cases are therefore often not
making independent decisions about whether a particular action is
harmful. Rather, they are following what they perceive to be precedent.
In contrast, when courts rule that certain actions are serious enough to
create liability, they often discuss the particular circumstances of the
plaintiff or his workplace and why the negative consequences are serious
in the particular context.11 Judges in subsequent cases do not as readily
perceive these earlier cases as precedent because the earlier cases rely so
heavily on the underlying facts of the cases to justify their conclusions.
Additionally, current retaliation law contains two different strands:
one that uses the harm standard to further the goals of retaliation law and
another that uses harm doctrine to limit the scope of retaliation claims.
The empirical research in this Article shows that these two strands are in
tension with one another and may lead to different answers about whether
particular actions should create liability.
Shifting the focus away from bias allows for a fuller exploration of
how structural and substantive features of discrimination law generally
and retaliation law specifically push the law in a restrictive direction. In
some ways, this turn away from bias as a central motivation mirrors a
conceptual change in how we understand discrimination itself. In the
early decades after the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), courts and academics often described discrimination as
resulting from bias or personal animus.12 While bias still exists, modern
academic commentary often explores how structural features of the
workplace and workplace decision-making lead to discrimination.13 In a
similar vein, this Article explores how the structures of judicial decisionmaking generally and in the specific context of retaliation lead to high
harm thresholds.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See id.
12. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 n.67 (2006).
13. See, e.g., id. (describing and critiquing the structural turn); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist
and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2370 (1994) (exploring structuralist and cultural domination influences); Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) (“[A] mounting body of evidence indicates
that a number of social and structural changes in the workplace have affected the ways in which
discrimination operates.”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (“[S]econd generation manifestations
of workplace bias are structural, relational, and situational.”).
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Given that courts themselves were largely responsible for
incentivizing employers to create internal complaint procedures and for
encouraging employees to complain, courts have a special responsibility
to correctly align the harm standard with retaliation law’s underlying
goals. To do this, courts should do two things. First, courts should
enshrine cautionary language within the retaliation harm doctrine that
warns courts that summary judgment in the employer’s favor is typically
inappropriate when the worker presents evidence of a negative
consequence. Second, courts should clarify that any action that is more
than de minimis meets the harm threshold as a matter of law.
In a small subset of cases, courts may determine that the consequences
the worker faced would typically be regarded as de minimis. In these
instances, the worker would still have the opportunity to prove that the
action was harmful in her circumstances. Assuming that the worker
presents evidence supporting a material dispute of fact regarding whether
the action was harmful in her particular case, summary judgment would
be inappropriate on the harm element of the retaliation claim.
Redescribing the harm inquiry in this way comports best with the
underlying goals of retaliation law. If the harm threshold is pegged to the
consequences that would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining,
the courts should recognize as a matter of law that most negative
consequences would dissuade a reasonable person. If the purpose of
retaliation law is to encourage workers to complain about discrimination,
then the law should protect workers who make a complaint.
Part I of the Article begins with an in-depth discussion of harm
thresholds in retaliation law. Part II provides the results of an empirical
study, which shows that the reasonable person standard enunciated by a
substantial number of courts is inconsistent with the views of reasonable
people. Part III explores the major implications of the study results. Part
IV discusses how perceived precedent pushes the law in a conservative
direction and describes the complexities in the current standard, including
two divergent strands within the retaliation harm doctrine. Finally, Part
V proposes two structural changes to the way courts approach retaliation
harm.
I. THE REASONABLE PERSON IN RETALIATION LAW
In numerous cases, federal appellate and district courts hold that a
worker’s failure to allege sufficient harm is fatal to establishing a
retaliation claim. These cases hold that an employee cannot establish a
cognizable retaliation claim, even if he alleged that his employer took the
following actions because of a discrimination complaint:
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Threatening to fire the employee;14
Negatively evaluating the employee or making disciplinary
write-ups;15
Threatening the employee with a suspension or disciplinary
action;16
Placing the employee on disciplinary or administrative leave;17
Making a shift change;18
Removing the employee from his office;19 or
Falsely reporting poor performance.20

Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are the main federal statutes
that prohibit employment discrimination.21 When taken together, these
statutes prohibit employment discrimination against individuals that is
based on their sex, race, color, national origin, religion, disability, or

14. See, e.g., Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. SDH
Educ. E. LLC, No. 312-cv-2961-TLW, 2014 WL 468974, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014); Gutierrez
v. GEO Grp., No. 11-cv-02648-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 2030024, at *3 (D. Colo. June 6, 2012);
Jantz v. Emblem Health, No. 10 Civ. 6076 (PKC), 2012 WL 370297, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2012); Pugni v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 05 Civ. 8026 (CM), 2007 WL 1087183, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2007).
15. See, e.g., Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 452 F. App’x 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2011); Sconfienza v.
Verizon Pa. Inc., 307 F. App’x 619, 622, 624 (3d Cir. 2008); Sesay-Harrell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Homeless Servs., No. 12 Civ. 925(KPF), 2013 WL 6244158, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013);
Augustus v. Napolitano, No. 11-120-JJB, 2013 WL 530586, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 11, 2013);
Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL 5940912,
at *5–7 (M.D. La. Nov. 27, 2012); Palmer-Williams v. Yale New Haven Hosp., Civ. No.
3:08cv1526 (JBA), 2011 WL 1226022, at *10 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2011); Carmellino v. Dist. 20
of N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 5942 PKC, 2006 WL 2583019, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2006).
16. See, e.g., Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2009); Ballard
v. Donahoe, No. 2:11-cv-2576 JAM AC PS, 2014 WL 1286193, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014);
Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Chang v. Safe Horizons,
254 F. App’x 838, 839 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that oral reprimands were not sufficient).
17. See, e.g., McKneely v. Zachary Police Dep’t, No. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL
4585160, at *10–11 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2013); Muse v. Jazz Casino Co., No. 09-0066, 2010 WL
2545278, at *3 (E.D. La. June 16, 2010).
18. See, e.g., Lushute v. La., Dep’t. of Social Servs., 479 F. App’x 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing an action arising from the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) using a Title VII
standard); McKneely, 2013 WL 4585160, at *10.
19. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Monguio v. Ohio State Univ., 499 F. App’x 455, 464 (6th Cir.
2012).
20. See, e.g., Littleton, 568 F.3d at 644.
21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012);
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012).
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age.22 These statutes also contain anti-retaliation provisions.23 For
example, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
employee or job applicant because that individual “opposed any practice”
made unlawful by Title VII or “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in” a Title VII proceeding or investigation.24
This Part first explores the origins of the reasonable person harm
threshold in retaliation law. It then discusses how courts interpret the
reasonable person standard in the retaliation context. It concludes with an
overview of scholarly critiques of the reasonable person construct.
A. Adverse Actions
Courts typically describe retaliation cases as requiring three elements.
First, the worker must engage in activity that the statutes protect, such as
complaining to the employer or an administrative agency about
discrimination.25 Second, the worker must suffer a negative consequence,
which the courts call an “adverse action.”26 Third, there must be a causal
connection between the protected activity and the negative
consequence.27
Over time, the courts developed the concept of an adverse action to
define how serious a negative consequence must be before it could
potentially lead to liability for retaliation.28 The courts began to use the
term “adverse action” or similar language to separate actions that would
potentially lead to liability from those that would not.29
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway v. White,30 which resolved a circuit split regarding the meaning
of the adverse action requirement in retaliation cases.31 Knowing the facts
of the case is necessary to understanding some of the later problems with
the retaliation harm threshold.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (a primary operative provision of Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–
(b) (same for ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (same for ADEA).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
25. Adams v. City of Montgomery, 569 F. App’x 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2014).
26. Id.
27. Id. This Section emphasizes the core elements of a retaliation claim. Some courts,
however, articulate the test differently. See, e.g., Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070–71
(10th Cir. 2004) (using a modified McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
burden-shifting test to evaluate a retaliation claim).
28. See generally Shannon Vincent, Unbalanced Responses to Employers Getting Even:
The Circuit Split over What Constitutes a Title VII-prohibited Retaliatory Adverse Employment
Action, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991 (2005) (analyzing the various adverse employment action
standards).
29. See id. at 992–93.
30. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
31. Id. at 57.
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Plaintiff Sheila White worked for Burlington Northern in its
Tennessee Yard as a track laborer.32 Although Ms. White performed other
tasks, her primary responsibility was to drive a forklift.33 In September of
1997, Ms. White lodged an internal complaint that her immediate
supervisor frequently told her that women should not work in his
department, and he insulted her in front of her male coworkers.34 The
company placed the supervisor on a ten-day suspension and required him
to attend sexual harassment training.35
Later that month, Burlington’s “roadmaster” removed Ms. White from
her forklift responsibilities, instead assigning her other job duties within
the track laborer’s job description.36 Ms. White filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that the company discriminated
against her and retaliated against her after she made the discrimination
complaint.37 Ms. White then alleged that the roadmaster started to closely
monitor her daily activities and placed her under surveillance at work.38
Ms. White filed another charge of discrimination based on the
surveillance.39
A few days later, Ms. White had a disagreement with another
supervisor.40 The supervisor alleged that Ms. White had been
insubordinate, and the roadmaster placed her on an unpaid suspension.41
After an internal grievance procedure, the company determined that Ms.
White had not been insubordinate and reinstated her with backpay for the
thirty-seven days of her suspension.42
Ms. White later filed claims in federal court alleging that her employer
retaliated against her by changing her job responsibilities and suspending
her without pay.43 A jury found in Ms. White’s favor on the retaliation
claim and awarded her compensatory damages.44
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 59.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 58–59.
43. Id. at 59. Although the Supreme Court mentioned the increased supervision of Ms.
White as the basis for one of her EEOC charges, it did not further discuss this aspect of her
retaliation claim. See id. at 60–72. Ms. White also alleged that her supervisor discriminated
against her based on her sex. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th
Cir. 2004).
44. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 59. The district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision below on
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The Supreme Court took Ms. White’s case to determine the meaning
of “discriminate[s] against” in the context of Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision, including the more specific issue of how much harm adverse
actions must cause to constitute discrimination.45 The Court held that the
anti-retaliation provisions cover those employer actions that “would have
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant.”46 The
Court further indicated that “the employer’s actions must be harmful to
the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.”47
The Court’s description of this standard did not end there. The Court
emphasized that the harm to the employee must be material and that the
Burlington decision is not meant to insulate employees against “petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.”48
The Court further explained that “[n]o one doubts that the term
‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions or differences in treatment
that injure protected individuals.”49 The Court specifically rejected the
idea that an adverse action required a negative impact on compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.50 It held that Congress
omitted these terms from the retaliation provision and that this omission
must reflect a lower harm threshold for retaliation claims than the one
found in the statute’s discrimination provisions.51
The Court also held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions are not
confined to actions relating to employment or occurring in the
workplace.52 By way of example, the Court noted that the goals of the
anti-retaliation provisions would not be met if employers could escape
liability by filing false criminal charges against an employee who
complained.53 Instead, the goal of Title VII’s retaliation provision is to
provide unfettered access to the statutory remedial scheme.54

the retaliation claim; however, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s
decision regarding the retaliation issues. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that a retaliatory action must
meet the level of an adverse employment action to be cognizable under Title VII, concluding that
a suspension without pay and reallocating job responsibilities constituted adverse employment
actions. White, 364 F.3d at 796, 803–04.
45. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 56–57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 57.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 68.
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id. at 61–62.
51. Id. at 62–63.
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. at 63–64.
54. Id. at 64.
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The reasonable person standard contemplated by the Court is that of
an objectively reasonable person.55 However, the Court noted that in
some circumstances the courts might alter the reasonable person standard
to include the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
position.56 For example, a schedule change might be inconsequential to
many workers but could dissuade a working mother from submitting a
complaint.57 The Court emphasized that the objective standard was meant
to eliminate a need for courts to interpret a plaintiff’s unusual, subjective
feelings.58
The Court found it difficult to fully articulate the types of actions that
constitute retaliation.59 Rather, the Court indicated that the context of
each particular case would matter: “The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”60 The Court
continued by noting that, in some circumstances, changes in an
employee’s work schedule or a supervisor’s exclusion of an employee
from a weekly training lunch might be actionable.61 Importantly, the
Court specifically stated that it did not want to provide a list of specific
prohibited acts because of the contextual nature of the harm inquiry.62
The way the Court applied its new standard to the facts of Ms. White’s
case is important. The Court held that the change in Ms. White’s job
duties was actionable because “[c]ommon sense suggests that one good
way to discourage an employee such as [Ms.] White from bringing
discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time
performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those that
are easier or more agreeable.”63 It then cited an EEOC Manual indicating
that Title VII prohibited retaliatory work assignments.64
But, in the following paragraph of the opinion, the Court indicated
that reassignment of job duties is not always actionable by stating that
“[w]hether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon
the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering
55. Id. at 68–69.
56. Id. at 69.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 68–69.
59. Id. at 69.
60. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 70–71.
64. Id. at 71.
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all the circumstances.”65 The Court noted that there was ample evidence
in Ms. White’s case that the change in her job responsibilities would be
materially adverse. This Article later explores how this particular
paragraph in Burlington has been problematic in subsequent cases.
In considering whether the rescinded suspension constituted an
adverse action, the Court noted that a month without pay would deter
most employees from filing a discrimination complaint.66 Although the
Court noted Ms. White’s particular evidence and the jury’s conclusion in
light of her evidence, the Court’s opinion strongly suggested that a
month-long suspension without pay would always be serious enough to
trigger protection under the retaliation provision.67
In his concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito noted that following the
majority’s interpretation of the statute would mean that “a retaliation
claim must go to the jury if the employee creates a genuine issue on . . .
[questions such as] whether the employee was given any more or less
work than others, was subjected to any more or less supervision, or was
treated in a somewhat less friendly manner because of his protected
activity.”68
B. Post-Burlington
After Burlington, lower courts began to apply the Supreme Court’s
language to different kinds of retaliation cases. Lower courts generally
agreed that terminations, pay reductions, and demotions are adverse
actions.69 Outside of these categories, the courts often denied relief to
employees, holding that the employee cannot prevail because he failed to
establish an adverse action.
In hundreds of subsequent cases, federal circuit and district courts
construed the adverse action requirement narrowly. Courts routinely
dismiss cases by concluding that workers did not suffer enough harm. As
discussed earlier, courts dismiss cases when workers allege that
employers subjected them to threatened termination; negative
evaluations; disciplinary write-ups; threatened suspensions; disciplinary
and administrative leave; shift changes; threatened criminal prosecution;
removal from an office; threatened disciplinary action; and reports of
poor performance.70
65. Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Id. at 72.
67. See id. at 72–73.
68. Id. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ohio State Univ., 549 F. App’x 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2013) (ruling in
context of FMLA but citing to Title VII’s retaliation standard).
70. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. As discussed later, the case law is not
completely uniform.
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When employees allege that employers take more than one action
against them, some courts divide the alleged actions and individually
determine whether each action meets the materiality requirement.71 Some
courts then determine that, even when combined, the alleged
consequences do not meet the adverse action requirement.72 As one court
colorfully stated: “[z]ero plus zero is zero.”73
Once a court finds that a particular consequence is not an adverse
action, subsequent courts often cite the earlier holding without exploring
any possible contextual differences between the two cases. This outcome
is especially puzzling in retaliation cases because the Supreme Court
provided examples of the same conduct that would be cognizable in one
context but not in another. The Court indicated that in some instances
exclusion from lunch would meet the harm threshold, but in other
circumstances it would not.74 The Court’s standard, while supposedly an
objective one, also contemplates a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
circumstances.
Courts assert numerous rationales for their holdings. They do not
explain many of these rationales well, and courts often refer to more than
one of the following reasons for denying relief to a plaintiff. One rationale
is that the retaliation statutes require a showing of harm and that the
negative consequence suffered by the employee is not an injury or harm.75
Courts often combine this rationale with the second, related concern that
retaliation law should not respond to trivial harms, petty slights, or minor
annoyances.76 Another concern is that a lower harm threshold will
unreasonably shield the employee from subsequent, appropriate
discipline for misconduct.77
II. THE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
This Article’s study used a paper survey to test how individuals
perceived retaliation harms. The survey first instructed participants to
imagine that they witnessed discrimination in the workplace. It then
71. See, e.g., McKneely v. Zachary Police Dep’t, No. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL
4585160, at *10–12 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2013).
72. E.g., id. at *11.
73. Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 572 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
74. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006).
75. Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2009).
76. See, e.g., Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ., 493 F. App’x 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2012); Lushute
v. La., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 479 F. App’x 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2012); Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady
of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr, Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL 5940912, at *7 n.3 (M.D. La. Nov. 27,
2012).
77. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Med. Univ. Hosp. Auth., No. 2:11-2028-RMG, 2013 WL 4041954,
at *24 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2013); Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 49 (D.D.C. 2009).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/4

12

Sperino: Retaliation and the Reasonable Person

2015]

RETALIATION AND THE REASONABLE PERSON

2043

asked the participants a series of ten questions about whether certain
actions would dissuade them from submitting a complaint about the
discrimination to an employer. The eleventh question asked participants
to indicate which actions in the list the participant considered to be only
minor annoyances or petty slights.
The original hypothesis for this study was that the results would show
that participants would define conduct that would dissuade a reasonable
person from filing a complaint at a different level than that found in most
court opinions. Another hypothesis was that study participants would
disagree with courts’ characterizations about what constitutes a minor
annoyance or petty slight in the workplace.
More than half of the study participants stated that the following
consequences would or might dissuade them from complaining about
discrimination: (1) being threatened with termination, (2) receiving a paid
seven-day suspension, (3) being moved to an office in another location,
(4) facing social ostracism from coworkers, and (5) facing a change in
job responsibilities with the same pay. Additionally, more than seventyfive percent of the study participants thought that a negative evaluation
placed in their file would or might dissuade them. These results stand in
stark contrast to the reasonable person harm threshold enshrined in many
court opinions.
A. Survey Design and Sample
The study’s sample consisted of ninety-five law students at the
University of Cincinnati College of Law. The age range for study
participants was twenty-one years of age to forty-five years of age, and
the median age was twenty-four years old. There were fifty-two men who
completed the survey and forty-two women. One student declined to
provide age and sex data. All participants responded to the eleven
substantive inquiries on the survey instrument.
The survey started by instructing each participant to imagine that he
witnessed discrimination in the workplace. Next, the survey asked the
participants a series of ten questions about whether certain actions would
dissuade them from submitting a complaint about the discrimination to
an employer. The survey asked participants about the following ten
actions:


A coworker stares rudely every day for a week;



Being fired;



A negative evaluation in an employment file;



A supervisor threatened termination but did not
immediately carry out the threat;
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A paid seven-day suspension;



An office move to another location;



A demotion;



Criticism from a supervisor about work performance
during a meeting attended by coworkers;



Social ostracism by coworkers; and



A change in job responsibilities with the same pay.

[Vol. 67

For each action, the survey participant could answer yes, no, maybe,
or do not know. The last question asked the survey participants to indicate
which of the above-listed actions the participant would consider to be
only minor annoyances or petty slights in the workplace. The participant
could circle as many items from the list as the participant thought
qualified as a minor annoyance or petty slight. The “minor annoyances”
or “petty slights” language mirrors the standard courts apply when
determining whether a plaintiff meets the required harm threshold.
B. Survey Results and How They Differ from Court Opinions
The study results show a strong consensus about what actions would
dissuade a reasonable person from filing a complaint. More than ninety
percent of the study participants thought that termination would or might
dissuade them from filing a complaint. About eighty percent thought that
a negative evaluation in their employment file or a demotion would or
might dissuade them. More than half of the study participants indicated
that the following consequences would or might dissuaded them from
filing a complaint: threatened termination, a paid seven-day suspension,
an office move to another location, social ostracism by coworkers, or a
change in job responsibilities with the same pay.
There were only two potential job consequences that a majority of
participants thought would be unlikely to prevent them from filing a
complaint: a coworker staring rudely every day for a week and criticism
from a supervisor about work performance during a meeting attended by
coworkers. However, a sizable portion of the study participants still
thought these actions would dissuade them from filing a complaint, with
slightly more than seventeen percent indicating that stares from a
coworker would or might dissuade them and more than forty-one percent
indicating that criticism from a supervisor would or might dissuade them.
The study results show that study participants viewed the most
harmful consequence as termination, followed in order of seriousness by
demotion, a negative evaluation in an employment file, threatened
termination, a change in job responsibilities with the same pay, an office
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move to another location, a paid seven-day suspension, and social
ostracism by coworkers. Participants rated criticism from a supervisor
about work performance during a meeting with coworkers and a
coworker staring rudely every day for a week as the least serious.
This data shows that the courts are correct in holding that termination
and demotion are likely to deter a person from filing a discrimination
complaint. More than ninety percent of participants thought termination
would or might dissuade them, and more than eighty-three percent
thought that a demotion would or might dissuade them.
Notably, eighty percent responded that a negative evaluation would or
might dissuade them. Recall that many courts hold that a negative
evaluation is not an adverse action because it does not result in any harm
to the employee.78 Additionally, more than sixty-eight percent of study
participants ranked a threatened termination as likely to dissuade. A long
line of cases, however, hold that a threatened termination would not
dissuade a reasonable person from filing a complaint.79 Thus, the most
important takeaway from this data is how significantly it differs from
most written judicial opinions.
Chart 1 provides the number and percentage of study participants who
marked that a particular negative consequence would or might dissuade
them from filing a complaint. The chart shows, in descending order, the
actions that participants viewed as most harmful to least harmful.
Chart 1. Percentage of Participants Who Would Not or Might Not
Complain if Faced with Consequence
Negative Consequence
Being fired
Demotion
A negative evaluation in an
employment file
Supervisor threatened termination but
did not immediately carry out the
threat
A change in job responsibilities with
the same pay
Office move to another location
Paid seven-day suspension
Social ostracism by coworkers
Criticism from a supervisor about work
performance during a meeting attended
by coworkers
A coworker stares rudely every day
for a week

Percentage of Participants Who
Would or Might Be Dissuaded
90.53%
83.16%
80%
68.42%
62.11%
55.79%
53.68%
50.53%
41.05%
17.89%

78. E.g., sources cited supra note 15.
79. E.g., sources cited supra note 14.
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In most categories, significant differences did not exist based on
whether the response was from a female or male participant. Chart 2
provides the data based on the sex of the participant.
Chart 2. Percentage of Participants Who Would Not or Might Not
Complain if Faced with Consequence, Differentiated by Sex
Negative Consequence

Being fired
Demotion
A negative evaluation in an
employment file
Supervisor threatened
termination but did not
immediately carry out the threat
A change in job responsibilities
with the same pay
Office move to another location
Paid seven-day suspension
Social ostracism by coworkers
Criticism from a supervisor about
work performance during a
meeting attended by coworkers
A coworker stares rudely every
day for a week

Percentage of Participants Who
Would or Might Be Dissuaded
(Male/Female)
90.38% (male)
90.48% (female)
84.62% (male)
80.95% (female)
82.69% (male)
78.57% (female)
63.46% (male)
73.81% (female)
63.46% (male)
59.52% (female)
65.38% (male)
45.24% (female)
53.85% (male)
52.38% (female)
57.69% (male)
42.86% (female)
40.38% (male)
40.48% (female)
17.31% (male)
16.67% (female)

In many categories, men and women reported nearly identical views
of what negative consequences would or might dissuade them from
complaining. Furthermore, for many actions where there was some
overall difference between male and female participants, a higher
percentage of male participants reported that the negative consequence
would dissuade them from complaining. Two data points are especially
interesting: both an office move and social ostracism were far more likely
to dissuade men in the study from complaining than women.
Chart 2 only included participants who stated that the negative
consequence would or might dissuade them from complaining and
excluded those who were uncertain about their reaction. In some
categories, a higher percentage of women than men answered that they
did not know whether the negative consequence would dissuade them
from complaining. For example, when responding to whether an office
move would dissuade a complaint, only two of the fifty-two male
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respondents answered “do not know,” while five of the forty-two female
respondents answered “do not know.”
This data conflicts with the harm threshold expressed in many judicial
opinions.80 The data also demonstrates that any claim that a high
retaliation harm threshold somehow reflects a male view of retaliation is
likely wrong.
C. Suggestions for Future Research
Researchers should conduct future studies to determine whether
others can replicate this study’s results with a larger sample size and nonstudent participants. It is possible that law students possess knowledge or
beliefs that differ from those possessed by non-students or from students
in other disciplines. For example, some studies suggest that students are
likely to overestimate both their willingness to complain about workplace
problems and their participation in altruistic behavior.81 Other studies
show that people answering surveys are likely to overestimate their
willingness to stand up to discriminatory conduct.82 It also is possible that
law students as a group feel less economically vulnerable than workers
and that law students’ training in professional responsibility makes them
more attuned to the importance of raising complaints about illegal
activity. Therefore, it is possible that results from this Article’s study
overestimate the likelihood that the person would complain. Future
research could also determine whether adjustments to the provided
discrimination hypothetical would change participants’ willingness to
complain. This Article’s study instructed participants to imagine that they
had witnessed discrimination against a coworker but did not provide
additional details about the discriminatory act. It would be interesting to
know whether changes in the prompt would alter participants’ reactions.
Adjustments to the prompt could include indicating the severity of the
discrimination and indicating the basis of the discriminatory act (such as
race, religion, or sex). Future studies could also evaluate whether workers
are more likely to complain about discrimination if it happens to them or
to others. Although this Article’s study focused on discrimination to
others, workers may be more motivated to complain about discrimination
happening to them. Further research is necessary to determine whether
the target of the discrimination affects the harm threshold.

80. See supra Section I.B.
81. See Robert A. Prentice, Beyond Temporal Explanations of Corporate Crime, 1 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 397, 417–18 (2013).
82. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 894–95 (2008).
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Other studies might also explore ways to reduce the possibility of
demand effects.83 A demand effect is when the study prompt might signal
that the researchers desire a particular outcome.84 In this Article’s study,
participants might perceive that the right thing to do if they witness
discrimination in the workplace is to report it. Some study participants
may have felt obligated to claim that they would not be dissuaded from
complaining about discrimination, even if they might be dissuaded in a
real life scenario. In an actual work environment, a worker may be able
to hide the fact that he witnessed discrimination, or the worker may think
that others will complain to stop the behavior.
Other research could also interrogate this study’s underlying question
using alternate methodologies, such as qualitative interviewing or
allowing study participants to witness a taped or live performance of
actors reenacting the discriminatory act.85 While a change in
methodology might triangulate the results and perhaps provide greater
nuance, most study-based methodologies are limited in that they do not
provide the full context of real-world retaliation, where workers may
have ongoing relationships with the person that the employer is
discriminating against and others in the workplace.
The survey instrument also did not take into account the possibility of
ambiguity in the underlying act of discrimination. It would be interesting
to know whether workers perceive the harm threshold differently if they
are less certain about whether the underlying conduct occurred or whether
it was discriminatory. Future projects might also consider how
uncertainty about the likelihood of a retaliatory consequence affects
results. This Article’s study asked participants to respond to concrete
consequences that the participants “knew” would occur. In the real world,
workers often do not know the consequences of complaining; rather, they
assume the risk of unknown consequences.
D. A Supplement to the Survey: Triangulating the Data
The study’s results show differences in the way that courts and law
students perceive the seriousness of workplace consequences. But even
prior to this study, courts had access to other data that suggested that
narrow judicial views of harm were not in line with how others would
83. See Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental
Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 940 (defining a demand effect as “when a subject acts in a
particular way to please the experimenter”).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard
in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 603 (1999), available at http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/law/5/3/5
96.pdf.
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view the retaliation standard. This Section explores ways to supplement
the survey results with existing data points. This data comes from three
different places: jury verdicts, contrary judicial opinions, and academic
research.
In many adverse action cases, courts grant summary judgment on
behalf of the employer.86 The few reported decisions involving jury
decisions suggest that courts are setting the adverse action standard
higher than some juries would. In some cases, a trial court submits a case
to a jury that rules in favor of the worker, only to have that determination
overturned on appeal or questioned on post-trial motions.87 These cases
provide an opportunity to understand what a jury concluded on the
adverse action prong.
In one case, a jury found for the plaintiff on a retaliation claim and
awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.88 The district court granted the
employer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
retaliation claim, and the federal appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision.89 The appellate court found that the actions taken against the
employee included three investigations to determine whether the plaintiff
engaged in misconduct, a counseling statement that was later rescinded,
a never-completed threat to terminate the plaintiff, and stares and
negative comments from others.90
Despite the jury’s verdict, the appellate court rejected the claim that
each of the above actions was adverse.91 The appellate court held that
investigating an employee’s conduct does not produce any injury or harm
and that such conduct is trivial and akin to a “petty slight[]” or “minor
annoyance[].”92 The court also concluded that empty verbal threats do not
produce injury.93 Thus, the jury verdict in favor of the worker contradicts
the findings of the appellate court.
In another case, a worker recorded a conversation in which a
supervisor threatened to terminate him for complaining to the EEOC
about discrimination.94 There was evidence that the supervisor told the
worker: “You aren’t going to work here until you get it reversed.”95 The
86. See, e.g., supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Ithaca, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249–50 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)
(granting a new trial on an adverse action issue).
88. Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 566, 574.
90. Id. at 568–71.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 569–70 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006)).
93. Id. at 571.
94. Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 676.
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worker alleged that “it” referred to the charge submitted to the EEOC.96
There was some evidence that after the conversation, the supervisor acted
as if the employee was not fired and that he sent a letter to the employee
asking him to return to work.97 The employee filed a retaliation claim
under Title VII.98 The jury found for the worker on this claim, awarding
him $100,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages.99 The trial court denied the employer’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law.100
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the jury
verdict.101 Even though the court acknowledged some prior cases that
recognized that a singular threat of termination might be enough to create
a cognizable claim, the court cryptically noted that the district court did
not consider that argument, and the appellate court declined to consider
it.102 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that the worker failed to
establish an adverse action.103
As described in Section I.B, many federal courts grant summary
judgment to employers in cases where workers allege that employers
retaliated against them through actions such as poor evaluations, shift
changes, and threatened terminations.104 These courts hold, as a matter of
law, that the alleged actions do not constitute adverse actions, a
determination based on whether the action would dissuade a reasonable
person from filing a discrimination complaint. However, some courts do
not grant summary judgment in similar circumstances.
Part I contained a list of actions that courts hold are not adverse actions
for retaliation claims. Considering that same list, it is possible to find
cases in which courts hold the exact opposite—that each of the following
consequences constitutes an adverse action:



Unrealized threat to terminate employee;105
Negative evaluations and disciplinary write-ups;106

96. See id. at 675.
97. Id. at 677.
98. Id.
99. Id. This amount exceeds the damages caps under Title VII and would be subject to them.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 681.
102. See id. at 681, n.2.
103. Id. at 681.
104. See supra Section I.B.
105. See, e.g., Maron v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 508 F. App’x 226, 230–31 (4th
Cir. 2013); Eldredge v. City of St. Paul, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1036 (D. Minn. 2011); E.E.O.C.
v. Collegeville/Imagineering, No. CV-05-3033-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 2051448, at *8 (D. Ariz.
July 16, 2007).
106. See, e.g., Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at
*13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012). Courts have held that a written warning or letter of counseling may
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Threat of suspension or disciplinary action;107
Placement on disciplinary or administrative leave;108
A shift change;109
An office move to another location;110
False report of poor performance.111

Indeed, even within the same circuit, some court of appeals panels will
hold that a certain action does not constitute an adverse action, while
another panel will hold that it does. For example, in one case the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that reprimands are adverse
employment actions.112 The Second Circuit reasoned that
a letter of reprimand would deter a reasonable employee
from exercising his FMLA rights. A formal reprimand
issued by an employer is not a “petty slight,” “minor
annoyance,” or “trivial” punishment; it can reduce an
employee’s likelihood of receiving future bonuses, raises,
and promotions, and it may lead the employee to believe
(correctly or not) that his job is in jeopardy.113
However, in another Second Circuit case, the court held that reprimands
are not adverse employment actions.114 This panel indicated that such
reprimands are merely petty slights and minor annoyances.115

rise to the level of an adverse employment action “if it affects the likelihood that the plaintiff will
be terminated, undermines the plaintiff’s current position, or affects the plaintiff’s future
employment opportunities.” Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1137 (10th Cir.
2005); see also Roberts v. Roadway Express, 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the written warnings constituted adverse employment actions, where “the record indicate[d] that
the more warnings an employee received, the more likely he or she was to be terminated for a
further infraction”).
107. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2009); O’Neal v. State
Univ. of N.Y., No. 01–CV–7802, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (informing
an employee that she was the subject of a disciplinary investigation was a material adverse action).
108. See, e.g., Killen v. Nw. Human Servs., Inc., No. 06-4100, 2007 WL 2684541, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007).
109. See, e.g., Taylor v. Roche, 196 F. App’x 799, 803 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a refusal
to grant a shift change is an adverse action).
110. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (indicating that “actions
like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet” would constitute an
adverse action).
111. See, e.g., Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1087, 1090–91 (10th Cir.
2007).
112. Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2011).
113. Id. at 165.
114. Leifer v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 391 F. App’x 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
115. Id.
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There are also cases in which courts hold that a combination of some
of these consequences constitutes an adverse action.116 In one case, the
court found that an adverse action existed when the worker complained
about inappropriate conduct and subsequently experienced delayed
paychecks, denial of personal time, criticism of her work performance,
and a shift change.117
In some of these cases, the courts articulate why the alleged action
might constitute an adverse action. One trial court reasoned that negative
evaluations constitute adverse employment actions because they “can
serve to have a chilling effect on an employee’s decision whether to
engage in statutorily protected activity.”118 Another court reasoned that
“[p]oor evaluations and letters of reprimand seem plainly to qualify” as
adverse actions.119 In cases where the employer threatens discipline but
does not carry it out, courts reason that this may deter employees from
filing discrimination complaints, even if future harm never
materializes.120 The fear of future harm is itself a deterrent.
These results complement academic research regarding retaliation.
The research shows that only a small percentage of people who
experience harassment in the workplace formally report it to their
employer.121 Workers are reluctant to complain about discrimination
because they fear being labeled a troublemaker and being subjected to
adverse consequences.122
III. IMPLICATIONS AND THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
The study results in this Article provide key insights about the
retaliation harm threshold. The most important insight relates to the
accuracy of the lower courts’ factual determinations that negative
consequences, such as threatened termination or negative evaluations,
would not dissuade reasonable people from complaining. These
determinations are likely incorrect. The current retaliation harm threshold
116. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010); Davis
v. City of Springfield, No. 03-3007, 2008 WL 361025, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (denying an
employer’s post-trial motions regarding whether denial of a transfer was an adverse action).
117. Alvarado, 384 F. App’x at 589.
118. Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at *13 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2012).
119. Ashby v. Shinseki, No. 2:11-1050-RMG-BHH, 2012 WL 6772175, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec.
12, 2012).
120. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[W]hether an
action is ‘materially adverse’ is determined by whether it holds a deterrent prospect of harm, and
not by whether the harm comes to pass or whether any effects are felt in the present.”).
121. Brake & Grossman, supra note 82, at 896.
122. See id. at 873; see also L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain
About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 712 (2007).
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is too high to accomplish one of the goals the courts created it for—to
provide a remedy whenever an employer takes an action that would
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination.
The study results also provide a basis for challenging the applicability
of traditional critiques of the reasonable person standard in the retaliation
context. Drawing on past critiques of the reasonable person standard, it
might seem plausible that the current case law reflects a male view of the
workplace. Others might claim that the case law enshrines a majority
view about retaliation harm but fails to reflect the views of certain
subgroups of people. This Article’s empirical research calls both of these
ideas into question.
For decades, scholars have criticized procedural and substantive
standards that require courts to evaluate facts through the lens of a
reasonable person or a reasonable juror.123 These scholars criticize the
reasonable person standard as having no fixed meaning and as being
merely a vehicle for judicial discretion.124 They have called the standard
“vague,”125 and one scholar noted that the standard only makes sense “if
it is not taken too seriously.”126
Some critiques stem from the standard’s origins as a reasonable man
standard. Scholars criticize the semantic change from reasonable man to
reasonable person as masking underlying male preferences that continue
to define the standard.127 In the sexual harassment context, scholars
criticize the reasonable person standard for enshrining the viewpoint of a
reasonable man and not that of a reasonable woman.128 Also in this
context, scholars have questioned whether courts should ever evaluate
123. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 445, 455–56 (1997); Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality,
Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 198 (1994); Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1177–78 (1990); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy,
and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 769; Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?,
45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2012); Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual
Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010).
124. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 456 (discussing the difference between reason
as the hallmark of the reasonable person and reason as “something like sensible, ordinary,
moderate, or average”); Moran, supra note 123, at 1234.
125. E.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 464.
126. George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
487, 496 (1995).
127. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard
in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1404 (1992); McGinley, supra note 123, at
5; see also Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on ThirdParty Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1357–58 (2010) (discussing
semantic changes in tort law).
128. See Moran, supra note 123, at 1250.
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harm that women experience differently under a reasonable person
standard or whether a gender-specific reasonable woman standard is
more appropriate.129
The reasonable woman standard draws critiques as artificially
constructing a unitary woman and as being insufficiently attentive to the
experiences of people of color. 130 When male judges apply a reasonable
woman standard, they may only pay “lip service” to the woman’s
perspective and actually apply the judge’s own perspective to the
particular problem.131 Additionally, even if one wanted to undertake a
reasonable person inquiry that accounts for relevant protected traits,
defining the reasonable person across a broad spectrum of race, sex,
disability, age, and religion is difficult.
Given these problems, the reasonable person standard often allows
courts to apply their own “common sense” notions about what constitutes
harm. These notions may be far different from what the normal female
worker would think of as sexual harassment.132 Using the reasonable
person standard suggests broad consensus on the appropriate standard for
sexual harassment, even when no consensus exists.133 These critiques
have been especially boisterous in the employment discrimination
context, where a reasonable person standard defines when employees
suffer enough harm to present a cognizable claim of workplace
harassment or retaliation.134
Scholars also often critique the standard as centered on a reasonable
white man and not representing the interests of women and people of
color.135 In the summary judgment context, one widely cited study
showed that while the Supreme Court Justices’ views of a videotaped
encounter with police comported with the views of a substantial number
of people, identifiable groups of people viewed the videotaped evidence
differently.136
129. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 479–82.
130. E.g., id. at 473; Dolkart, supra note 123, at 206; Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588–89 (1990) (criticizing feminist
theory for being essentialist); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment
of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 824–27 (2010) (critiquing harassment law).
131. Dolkart, supra note 123, at 200.
132. Ehrenreich, supra note 123, at 1206.
133. Id.
134. See sources cited supra note 123.
135. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 473; Dolkart, supra note 123, at 206; Ontiveros,
supra note 130, at 824–27; Harris, supra note 130, at 582–83; David Schultz, From Reasonable
Man to Unreasonable Victim?: Assessing Harris v. Forklift Systems and Shifting Standard of
Proof and Perspective in Title VII Sexual Harassment Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 717–20
(1993) (summarizing critiques).
136. See generally Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 848–79 (2009).
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This Article’s study results show that the courts’ retaliation harm
threshold cases do not present two of the common flaws associated with
the reasonable person construct. As discussed throughout this Section,
scholars critique the reasonable person standard because although it
represents a majority view, it fails to capture the views of other
identifiable groups of people. This Article shows that the reasonable
person standard created by courts in the retaliation context fails to reflect
the views of most reasonable people.
In the sexual harassment context, scholars argue that the standard
represents a male view. This Article’s study shows that men and women
have strikingly similar views of retaliation harm.137 This is not a case
where male judges are creating a harm standard that reflects the views of
men. Rather, many courts are creating a standard that contradicts what
most reasonable workers, whether male or female, would perceive as
harmful.
IV. THE TURN AWAY FROM BIAS
If bias is operating in the retaliation context, it is demonstrably
different than the bias theorized by two of the dominant accounts
discussed above.138 The results from this Article’s study, when combined
with a review of the relevant court opinions, suggest two other
explanations for the resulting case law: norms of judicial decisionmaking and a complex and internally inconsistent harm doctrine.
When judges write opinions advocating a high harm threshold, they
often issue broad opinions that appear to hold, as a matter of law, that a
particular action is never serious enough to create liability. In contrast,
court opinions that find that a particular action might be cognizable tend
to discuss the particular circumstances of the plaintiff and read as if the
court perceives the remaining question as one of fact. Thus, the high harm
threshold cases appear to be precedent for subsequent cases, while the
cases supporting a lower threshold do not.

137. See Section II.B.
138. It is possible that federal judges, as a group, view workplace harms differently than a
reasonable worker. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather
Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 675 (2003). Federal district and appellate court
judges possess greater job security than the majority of workers. See Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1984). Their income level is also higher
than most workers. Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee Be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise:
An Examination of the Federal Judiciary Salary “Crisis,” 87 MARQ. L. REV. 55, 81 n.155 (2003).
They also work in an atypical environment, surrounded by many employees whom they
personally hired. Article III judges are not subjected to a typical annual review process. See id. at
108 & n.308. These judges have higher levels of education than the typical worker. Further, they
understand, at least to some degree, the protections afforded under federal discrimination law.
These facts may account for some of the disconnect in retaliation law.
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Additionally, some of the high harm threshold cases appear to be cases
where the court is actually concerned about whether the worker can
establish causation. The court often rules for the employer on both the
adverse action element and the causation element. The adverse action
doctrine seemingly serves as a proxy argument for the court’s real
concern about causation.
Judicially constructed retaliation doctrines unnecessarily complicate
the harm question. The doctrine is difficult to navigate, especially
because it invokes a reasonable person construct that is unlike the
reasonable person inquiry used in other types of cases. This Article’s
survey research also reveals an internal tension within the Supreme
Court’s description of retaliation harm.
This move away from bias as the sole driver of outcomes mirrors a
similar ongoing change in understanding discrimination itself. Early
descriptions of discrimination often relied heavily on explicit animus.139
Discrimination happened because supervisors disliked people with
certain traits or felt that they did not belong in the workplace. Later work
added the idea of implicit bias.140
Some recent scholarship, however, has focused on the structural turn
in discrimination.141 The remainder of this Article discusses how the
structure and substance of retaliation law itself contributes to a
jurisprudence that favors a higher harm threshold, even when the
articulated standard for defining harm seems to point to a lower harm
requirement.
This Part does not argue that some judges are not biased against
retaliation claims. Rather, it argues that many judges are not imposing
their own viewpoints on retaliation law. They are, in a formalist way,
trying to apply law they believe governs the claims. This Part argues that
the way courts approach the adverse action requirement plays a
significant role in shaping the law in a conservative direction.
A. The Problem of Perceived Precedent
Some readers may ask themselves how a judge could credibly claim
that an employee is not harmed if she receives a negative evaluation or if
her supervisor threatens to fire her. Even without this Article’s survey

139. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987).
140. See, e.g., id. at 327–28; see also generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95
VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009) (exploring the law’s ability to affect implicit bias).
141. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 1–4; Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007);
Green, supra note 13, at 138; Sturm, supra note 13, at 459–60.
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data, it seems to be common sense that threats of termination or negative
evaluations would affect an employee’s willingness to complain.
But, this question assumes that courts are actually conducting an
inquiry into what the harm threshold should be when they issue opinions.
This is not happening in all cases. In many instances, court opinions
reflect little independent analysis of whether a particular action would
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. Many trial and appellate
courts are not asking how a reasonable person might think about a
particular kind of harm.
Rather, their opinions cite prior cases that appear to hold that
particular actions are not adverse actions. I call this phenomenon
“perceived precedent.” This phenomenon occurs when a lower court or
appellate court perceives a prior decision as determining as a matter of
law that certain actions are not cognizable. Consequently, subsequent
courts see no reason to revisit the harm inquiry and may feel compelled
to reach the same result as the prior case. Even in instances where the
prior case law is not technically precedent, the court follows what it
perceives to be the majority view on whether a particular form of conduct
constitutes an adverse action.
In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
a grant of summary judgment for the employer on an employee’s
retaliation claim.142 The court opined that reprimands and “the mere
threat of termination do[] not constitute an adverse employment
action.”143 In later cases, trial courts read the Ninth Circuit opinion as
stating that such conduct cannot constitute an adverse action.144
In another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that a wide swath of conduct does not constitute an adverse action,
including issuing a disciplinary warning for reporting late to work,
denying the plaintiff time off from work and overtime, denying the
plaintiff a shift change, and assigning the plaintiff more difficult tasks
than coworkers.145 The court engaged in very little discussion about why
these events either separately or together do not constitute an adverse
action.146 The decision includes no discussion of the worker’s individual
circumstances, even though the Fifth Circuit cited Burlington.147
Nonetheless, a subsequent district court cited the Fifth Circuit opinion to
142. Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Bogner v. R&B Sys., Inc., No. CV-10-193-JLQ, 2011 WL 1832750, at
*7 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 2011); Campbell-Thomson v. Cox Commc’ns, No. CV-08-1656-PHXGMS, 2010 WL 1814844, at *6 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2010); Yee v. Solis, No. C-08-4259 MMC, 2010
WL 1655816, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010).
145. Hart v. Life Care Ctr. of Plano, 243 F. App’x 816, 818 (5th Cir. 2007).
146. See id.
147. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 4

2058

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

justify its holding that assigning more arduous work is not an adverse
employment action.148
Appellate courts often make strong pronouncements that certain
actions do not constitute an adverse action.149 In subsequent cases, courts
then cite the earlier decision for the broad proposition that the actions are
not adverse actions.150 In some cases, the original case provides some
discussion of the plaintiff’s circumstances, but these subjective
circumstances do not make it into later summaries of the case. This
especially happens through string cites, where one court cites several
prior cases simply by summarizing the holding in an explanatory
parenthetical following the citation. It is easy to understand how the
nuances of a case can become lost when a subsequent court reduces its
facts to a parenthetical.
Over time, these opinions have developed into a body of case law that
appears to be precedent requiring subsequent lower courts to reach a
particular result, without any independent reasoning or consideration of
any subjective aspects of the particular case. Other opinions have
developed into what appears to be a majority view of whether, as a matter
of law, certain actions should be adverse actions. While this “majority
view” is not technically binding on courts, it does have significant
persuasive power.
Holdings that favor a higher harm threshold often read as binding
authority because courts frame them as questions of law. In contrast,
cases favoring a lower harm threshold read as ad hoc determinations
based on the facts of the case.
When courts deny summary judgment motions on the adverse action
element, their opinions often read as if they are not binding on future
148. Belcher v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 4:10-CV-3475, 2013 WL 499858, at *6, *12 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 8, 2013).
149. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the denial of a transfer can only be an adverse action if the transfer would have
resulted in higher pay or benefits and that isolated name calling is not actionable); see also Fiero
v. CSG Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874, 880 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that placement on a performance
improvement plan is not an adverse action); Smith v. City of Fort Pierce, 565 F. App’x 774, 778
(11th Cir. 2014) (“As an initial matter, glaring, slamming a door in an employee’s face, inquiring
into retirement plans, commenting that an employee is not a team player, blaming an employee
for failed union negotiations, or harboring concerns over an employee’s dependability and
trustworthiness are not actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”).
150. For example, subsequent cases cite to Brown for the proposition that certain actions
cannot constitute adverse actions. Rohler v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 523 F. App’x 418, 421 (7th Cir.
2013); Fabiyi v. McDonald’s Corp., 11 CV 8085, 2014 WL 985415, *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014);
Selan v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365-U, 10 CV 7223, 2013 WL 146415, *6 n.7 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 14, 2013) (indicating that “[t]hose claims are thus clearly not adverse employment actions
and will not be discussed further”).
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cases. This is because many of these opinions note the plaintiff’s
individual circumstances as one of the factors militating against summary
judgment and also note how a reasonable person would perceive
particular actions in the plaintiff’s particular workplace.151 If a
subsequent court read this type of case, it would be easy for that later
court to distinguish the new case from the prior case by contrasting the
two factual scenarios.
Some of these low harm threshold cases assume, without deciding,
that the alleged action constitutes an adverse action and then focus on
other elements of the retaliation claim. For example, in one case where a
referral for discipline constituted an adverse action, the court’s opinion
noted that the defendant largely challenged other elements of the
retaliation claim.152 These cases would not count as precedent in a
subsequent case.
When a jury finds that a certain action is or is not an adverse action,
that finding is not precedent. Even though jury verdicts provide a body of
law that might contain information about the harm threshold, it is easy
for courts to disregard this body of law in subsequent cases. It is not
precedent; rather, it is the application of law to a particular set of
circumstances.
The higher harm threshold cases tend to focus only on the action taken
and make broad statements about that action in a vacuum. These cases
read as if they are pronouncements of law, and subsequent courts often
seem to perceive them that way. If just a handful of appellate decisions
hold that a particular action is not serious enough to create liability for
retaliation, this handful of decisions can have a large impact in
subsequent cases. Courts in these subsequent cases may feel that they are
unable to change the existing law.
Perceived precedent is problematic for several reasons. First, as
discussed throughout this Article, it is likely wrong regarding the severity
of harm needed to dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. This
Article’s study and jury verdicts show that workers perceive threatened
terminations, negative evaluations, and other actions as being harmful
and likely to dissuade them from complaining about discrimination.
151. See, e.g., Maron v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 508 F. App’x 226, 231 (4th Cir.
2013); Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Here, there is evidence that
the security investigation posed an objective threat to plaintiff’s career, such that a jury could find
that the investigation was ‘materially adverse.’ . . . [A]n allegation that an FBI agent was a security
risk, particularly an agent ‘in such a sensitive assignment as Riyadh,’ is a ‘very serious allegation’
with ‘potentially devastating effects’ on that agent’s career.”). Not all lower threshold cases rely
heavily on the worker’s circumstances. See, e.g., Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10
C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012).
152. Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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But more importantly, the high harm threshold cases disregard
Burlington. In Burlington, the Supreme Court provided examples of
when an action might be severe enough to cross the harm threshold.153
The Court provided a specific example—whether not receiving an
invitation to lunch would be cognizable.154 The Court indicated that
normally a supervisor excluding an employee from lunch would not be
actionable.155 But, the Court continued: “[T]o retaliate by excluding an
employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to
the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable
employee from complaining about discrimination.”156 Thus, anything as
serious as or more serious than exclusion from a training lunch is
potentially cognizable under Burlington.
In situations where the kind of negative consequence does not seem
to be serious in the run of the mill case, the Supreme Court explicitly
indicated that the particular circumstances of the plaintiff or her
workplace might change the normal outcome. The reasonable person
contemplated by the Court is an objectively reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position.157 The standard expressly incorporates subjective
aspects of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s workplace.158
As the Court specifically stated, “Context matters.”159 It elaborated:
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed. A schedule change in an employee’s work
schedule may make little difference to many workers, but
may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age
children. . . . Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general
terms rather than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an
act that would be immaterial in some situations is material
in others.160
In case after case, appellate courts determine that a certain action does
not constitute an adverse action without mentioning any of the individual
circumstances of the plaintiff or his workplace. While purporting to apply
153. 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006).
154. Id. at 69.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 68–69.
158. Id. at 69.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) and
Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Burlington, courts also ignore a significant portion of the opinion and
consequently are not following the applicable law. As discussed below,
the confusing Burlington opinion has led to inconsistent case law in lower
courts. The perceived precedent ignores this inconsistency.
It would be a major advance in retaliation harm jurisprudence for
courts to understand that very few decisions are binding precedent in
subsequent cases. In most cases, it is incorrect to make broad, categorical
claims that certain actions can never lead to liability. Litigants arguing
for a lower harm threshold may need to educate courts about the
perceived precedent problem.
B. Alternate Holdings and Proxy Arguments
Similarly, alternate holdings push adverse action law in a conservative
direction. In many cases where a court rules that a certain action is not an
adverse action, the case does not rest solely on this ground.161 For
example, the court will hold that a particular action is not an adverse
action and that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection
between protected activity and the negative consequence.162
Courts in many adverse action cases seem concerned about whether
the worker can establish causation—the required link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Professor Deborah Brake has
argued that courts have unnecessarily construed the protected activity
element of retaliation cases narrowly in cases where the real concern
appears to be causation.163 The same phenomenon happens in adverse
action cases.
This pressure may occur because many courts are unhappy with
causation jurisprudence. In many circuits, a worker can establish the
required causal connection by showing a temporal connection between
her protected activity and the negative consequence.164 For example, if a
worker complains about discrimination and then two months later she
receives a bad evaluation, some courts will hold that the worker’s claim
should survive summary judgment on the causation element. The short
time span between the complaint and the bad evaluation suggests that the
prior complaint may have motivated the bad evaluation.165
Some courts are uncomfortable with causation law because they
believe it improperly insulates the worker from legitimate discipline after
161. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (7th Cir.
2012).
162. See, e.g., id.
163. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 155 (2014).
164. See, e.g., Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2008);
Grier v. Snow, 206 F. App’x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2006).
165. See, e.g., Mickey, 516 F.3d at 527–28.
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he complains about discrimination.166 Some of them use adverse action
arguments as proxies for the causation question. Others use the adverse
action argument to bolster the conclusion they already reached on
causation. If a court is uncomfortable with the causation analysis, it is
easier to rule in favor of the employer by limiting the reach of the adverse
action prong, which some courts view as a question of law. In contrast,
questions of fact often exist about the causation element, making it more
difficult to dispose of causation issues at the summary judgment stage.167
This places unnecessary pressure on the adverse action element,
making the substantive standard more onerous than it should be to
accomplish its underlying goals. The reasoning for the adverse action
element often feels unsatisfactory because it is often a proxy argument
for causation concerns.
C. Inherent Tension Within Retaliation Doctrine
This Article’s empirical research demonstrates that the current
adverse action standard is problematic because it asks courts to navigate
two separate, and sometimes contradictory, strands of the Burlington
decision. In Burlington, the Court explained that adverse actions are
“employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant.”168 The Court also indicated that
“the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”169 Additionally, the reasonable person standard is not
meant to insulate employees against “petty slights, minor annoyances,
and simple lack of good manners.”170
According to Burlington, the adverse action requirement encompasses
multiple inquiries: one question of what actions would dissuade a
reasonable person and another about whether the action rises above the
level of petty slights and minor annoyances.171 The Court’s description
of the adverse action requirement suggested that both of these inquiries
should yield the same answer. In other words, if a person perceives an
action as only being a petty slight, then that person should also think that
the same action would not dissuade a reasonable person from
complaining about discrimination.
This Article’s survey results show that an overwhelming number of
participants answered these two questions differently when considering
166. See, e.g., Chivers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 641 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2011).
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:09CV668 DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL
2415336 at *2 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
168. 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
169. Id. at 57.
170. Id. at 68.
171. Id.
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the same underlying conduct. The study asked participants to first
determine whether ten actions would dissuade them from complaining
about discrimination against a coworker. The eleventh question asked the
survey participants to indicate which of those ten actions the participant
would consider to be only minor annoyances or petty slights. The
participant could circle as many items from the list as the participant
thought met the criteria of being a minor annoyance or petty slight.
Only twenty-two of the ninety-five participants—less than twentyfour percent—answered questions 1 through 10 in a way that was
consistent with their answer to question 11. In other words, more than
seventy-five percent of study participants did not get the same answers
when asked to apply the two legal standards to the same conduct. For
example, although social ostracism by coworkers was enough to dissuade
a participant from complaining, the same participant could still consider
social ostracism to only be a petty slight. These results indicate that the
two ideas—willingness to complain and perceptions of annoyance or
pettiness—are not necessarily consistent.
The participants’ answers point to a possible tension in the underlying
law. When courts consider whether an adverse action would dissuade a
reasonable person and whether it is more than a petty slight, these two
questions do not necessarily lead to the same result. However, the current
doctrine does not recognize this tension.
D. An Inconsistent History
As discussed in the prior Section, existing doctrine contains two
strands: one that uses the harm doctrine to limit claims and the other that
uses it to further the underlying goals of retaliation law. The current
doctrine does not inform courts on how to navigate between these
potentially contradictory views of the retaliation standard. Nor does it
adequately explain how the reasonable person standard furthers the
underlying goals of retaliation law. If examined carefully, it is
questionable whether the substantive standard even does so. Faced with
a convoluted standard with unclear goals, it is understandable that courts
would refuse to navigate the complexity and favor bright-line rules.
This is especially true when considering that the harm standard is not
the only complex question facing courts in many retaliation cases.
Although this Article has isolated the applicable law and highlighted the
relevant issues, this is not how cases look when courts evaluate them. For
example, many retaliation cases also raise discrimination claims. If an
employee complained about discrimination by her employer and then
faced a negative consequence, the worker could raise both a
discrimination claim and a retaliation claim.
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Over time, discrimination law has become extraordinarily complex. It
consists of a series of complicated frameworks172 that each contains
numerous subparts.173 The subparts themselves are often complicated,
and some are even the basis of circuit splits.174 By the time courts analyze
the retaliation case, they have often already navigated a complex set of
analytical frameworks for the discrimination claim.175
Even standing alone, the retaliation harm doctrine is not simple. It
combines three different sets of legal terminology with further
explanatory language added by the Supreme Court.176 Looking at how
retaliation harm jurisprudence developed over time shows that some of
this history pulls the law toward a narrow construction of the adverse
action element.
The language of Title VII’s retaliation provisions makes it unlawful
for an employer to “discriminate” against an employee “because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.”177 The ADEA and ADA contain similar
language.178 However, these statutes’ retaliation provisions do not use the
words “adverse action” or “adverse employment action.”179
The words “adverse action” or “adverse employment action”
originally developed in the discrimination context.180 Courts used these
words to summarize all of the potential actions that might result in
liability for discrimination under Title VII. Rather than list that Title VII
prohibits terminations, failures to promote, failures to hire, pay
differentials, and other actions based on a protected trait, the courts used
the shorthand reference of “adverse action” or “adverse employment
action.”181
172. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV.
69, 70–81 (2011).
173. See id. at 118–21 (arguing that the use of judicially created frameworks in employment
discrimination law results in a faulty conceptualization of discrimination).
174. Id. at 120, 123.
175. This inquiry can become even more complex when the worker brings state law claims.
States often have laws that prohibit discrimination and retaliation. Although many state laws
follow federal law, some require a different analysis. In these instances, courts apply multiple
tests to evaluate one set of facts.
176. See infra notes 177–86 and accompanying text.
177. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012).
178. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (2012); id. § 12203(a).
180. See Vincent, supra note 28, at 991–92.
181. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that adverse
action is defined broadly).
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In discrimination law, the purpose of the adverse action element then
changed. Courts began using the words “adverse action” or similar
language as words of limitation.182 These words came to denote a
distinction between those actions for which the law would provide a
remedy and those for which it would not.183
Courts then adopted the adverse action language in the retaliation
context. In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that the adverse action
concept in Title VII’s retaliation provision was much broader than
adverse action in the discrimination context.184 Yet, the Court continued
to use the words “adverse action” to describe harm required in the
retaliation context. Burlington used the phrase “adverse action” but never
discussed how the term related to the actual text of the retaliation
provision itself, even though the doctrine the court articulated varied from
how most courts defined this term prior to Burlington.185
The way the Court described the adverse action inquiry suggested at
least two different functions of the element. The Court explained the
element as limiting the reach of retaliation law by denying a remedy to
workers who faced only petty slights.186 But, the provision also tried to
connect harm doctrine to the broader goals of retaliation law generally by
trying to determine what actions would deter a reasonable worker from
complaining about discrimination. As discussed in the prior Section, the
two functions sometimes point in different directions. It is easy to
understand how a court that perceives the words “adverse action” as
being words of limitation would interpret the term conservatively.
However, there are additional layers of complexity. The statute uses
the word “discriminate” to describe what employers cannot do,187 and the
courts use the words “adverse action” to describe when the statute
provides a remedy.188 In Burlington, the Court described the term adverse
action as incorporating the concept of a reasonable person.189 The Court
then imbued the reasonable person concept with its own meaning.190
Thus, courts interpreting the harm doctrine are navigating three different
sets of terminology: the word “discriminate” used in the statute, the term
“adverse action” created by the courts and interpreted differently over
time, and the term “reasonable person.”
182.
183.
2012).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra Section I.A.
See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (7th Cir.
548 U.S. 53, 70–71 (2006).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 69.
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (2012).
See, e.g., Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57.
Id.
Id.
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On top of this is the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss, which fails to
describe how these three terms fit together or how the reasonable person
standard supports the underlying goals of retaliation law. It is easy to see
how lower courts, when faced with this complexity, would produce case
law that is poorly reasoned.
In a sense, the courts’ difficulty with the reasonable person standard
in retaliation cases highlights an inherent problem in reasonable person
doctrine. The law generally uses the words “reasonable person” in many
different contexts, from contract law to criminal law to tort law.191 Yet,
the courts have never reconciled what exactly the reasonable person test
is supposed to accomplish in each circumstance.192
To make matters worse in the retaliation context, the meaning of
“reasonable person” is different than the meaning of the same words in
tort law. In recent years, the Supreme Court has touted the purported
connection between tort law and discrimination law.193 The Court has
called Title VII a tort and robustly incorporated tort concepts into
discrimination and retaliation doctrine.194 If lower courts believe this
framing device—that discrimination law belongs under the umbrella of
tort law—it would be natural for those courts to apply tort concepts such
as the reasonable person construct to discrimination and retaliation law.
There is one major problem with this application. The reasonable
person standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Burlington is
substantively different than tort law’s reasonable person standard. Tort
law’s reasonable person construct ignores many of the subjective traits of
the individual, with some well-recognized exceptions. Under tort law, the
reasonable person standard properly takes into account subjective factors
such as the wrongdoer’s age and certain physical limitations.195
However, at least as articulated in many legal opinions, the standard
does not consider many other characteristics of the wrongdoer, even if
these traits are arguably relevant to deciding legal culpability. For
example, tort law does not typically allow a judge or jury to consider a
wrongdoer’s mental or emotional disability.196 Tort law also does not
consider whether the wrongdoer was poor, a single mother, or lacked a
certain level of intelligence.197 Under tort law, these subjective
circumstances of the wrongdoer generally are irrelevant to the legal
191. Moran, supra note 123, at 1234.
192. See id. at 1234–38.
193. See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2014).
194. Id. at 1063–68.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 9–
11 (2010).
196. Id. § 11.
197. See id. § 12.
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inquiry. However, the retaliation doctrine requires that these subjective
circumstances be taken into account.
The retaliation reasonable person is radically different for several
reasons. In tort law, the reasonable person standard inquires into the
conduct of a wrongdoer to establish whether the wrongdoer breached a
duty of care.198 In contrast, in retaliation law, courts evaluate the
perspective of a potential victim, cloaked with some of the individual
plaintiff’s subjective characteristics and viewed through the lens of an
objectively reasonable person.199 This inquiry focuses on the level of
harm that must occur and the underlying goals of retaliation law.
In tort law, the reasonable person question arises most often in the
context of negligence.200 In retaliation law, the courts use the reasonable
person standard to define the level of harm needed to create liability for
what the courts deem to be intentional conduct.201 In tort law, it is
sometimes possible to declare, as a matter of law, that certain conduct
does not create liability because the defendant violated no duty. The court
must ignore many of the subjective characteristics of the wrongdoer. But,
this is not the case with retaliation law, where the doctrine expressly calls
for the court to consider some characteristics of both the victim and the
workplace in a particular case, at least in some instances.202
Tort law uses the words “reasonable person” to describe one concept,
and retaliation law uses those same words to describe a substantively
different concept. It is easy to see how a court not steeped in the nuances
of discrimination and tort law might miss these substantive differences.
In doing so, the court is likely to ignore the subjective elements of a
particular case.
The Burlington decision adds another layer of difficulty because the
legal standard it announced does not clearly align with the goals the Court
expressed for Title VII’s retaliation provision. Burlington does not
provide lower courts with clear guidance on when to invoke the worker’s
subjective circumstances and when to view the harm question purely
through an objective lens. As discussed earlier, many courts seem to
ignore Burlington’s language indicating that the worker’s subjective
circumstances should sometimes play a role.203 One reason courts may
ignore the subjective analysis is that it does not seem to make sense for
most cases.
198. Id. § 7.
199. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 375, 446–51 (2010).
200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(2010).
201. See supra Section I.B.
202. See supra Section I.A.
203. See supra Section IV.A.
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Courts are not always required to consider the worker’s subjective
circumstances. For example, if a worker claims her employer fired her
for complaining about discrimination, courts do not conduct an individual
analysis to see if the worker’s particular circumstances affected the harm
inquiry. A termination is always serious enough to create liability. Other
actions, such as failing to promote or paying a worker less because of a
discrimination complaint, also fall within that category. There is no
subjective analysis needed.
When do the subjective circumstances of the worker start to matter?
Burlington suggests that a subjective inquiry is required for changes in
job assignments and is unclear about whether the subjective inquiry is
required for unpaid suspensions. But, if this is the correct way to read
Burlington, it makes little sense in actual litigation or in enforcing the
goals of retaliation law.
In a large number of cases, the worker will not be able to tell whether
she faced cognizable retaliation harm until summary judgment or trial.
She would be required to wait until a judge or a jury weighs all of her
subjective circumstances. Likewise, the employer will not know whether
the employer violated the retaliation provision until litigation. The harm
standard for retaliation law would allow juries to make ad hoc
determinations about a wide range of conduct in a wide range of
particular circumstances.
Further, it is unclear why Burlington asks whether the action would
dissuade a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s circumstances from
complaining about discrimination. In most retaliation cases, the plaintiff
has already complained. He can bring the retaliation claim because he is
alleging that his complaint led to a negative consequence.
Adding in the subjective element in these cases makes for a strange
analysis. It is not clear what a lower court is supposed to do. Is the court
supposed to pretend to go back in time and imagine whether this
particular worker would have complained if she had known that a
particular outcome would occur? Not only does this analysis not make
sense, it also ignores that part of the power of retaliatory actions is that
workers do not know the full extent of what might happen to them.
Burlington does a poor job of explaining how its test navigates the
purposes of retaliation law. Retaliation law provides an individual
remedy, but it also does much more. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
invoked what Professor Richard Moberly refers to as a law enforcement
rationale for retaliation law.204 Retaliation doctrine exists, in part, to
protect society’s interest in having its laws enforced.205 It seems odd that

204. Moberly, supra note 199, at 380.
205. Id. at 378–79.
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society’s interest is met by having the harm threshold depend on an
individual plaintiff’s subjective circumstances in a wide range of cases.
V. BEYOND JUDICIAL MODESTY
Some possible solutions for dealing with these problems include
encouraging courts to exercise judicial modesty in undertaking inquiries
based on the reasonable person standard or encouraging courts to actively
seek out and consider the perspectives of others.206 These proposals exist
in other contexts, and they move in the right direction.207 However, they
are insufficient in the retaliation context.
Judicial modesty and similar perspective-shifting proposals respond
to the idea that court opinions capture the view of some, but not all,
relevant people. This Article, however, suggests that retaliation law’s
harm standard fails to capture the views of most people. The majority of
courts do not actually inquire about what a reasonable person would do
in a particular circumstance because so many courts follow prior cases
that they consider to be binding. Further, the retaliation harm doctrine is
so difficult to navigate that the resulting decisions are understandably
unsatisfying.
Identifying structural and substantive problems with the retaliation
harm standard makes it easier to see that structural and substantive
responses could better align the law with its underlying goals. The
available evidence shows that court rulings about these underlying
questions do not align with the articulated purpose of retaliation law. If
the underlying purpose of retaliation law is to encourage people to
complain about discrimination, then the current majority rules fail to
accomplish this for a wide swath of potential retaliatory conduct.
This Article argues that courts should refrain from navigating the
harm threshold in these fine-grained ways. Rather, courts should use the
results of this Article’s study to understand that many negative
consequences would dissuade reasonable people from complaining about
discrimination.
The retaliation harm standard should focus on one goal—separating
de minimis harm from all other actions. Any negative consequence that
is more than de minimis should create liability under retaliation law, if
the worker can meet the other elements of the retaliation claim. For
actions that would typically be considered de minimis, the worker would
still have an opportunity to show that in his subjective circumstances, the
actions caused material harm. In cases with contested facts, the fact finder
then would determine whether liability exists in the particular case.
206. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 881–82
(1990).
207. See id.
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This Part describes what function the harm threshold should perform.
It then explores why the de minimis standard better aligns judicial inquiry
with judicial and procedural competence, with the underlying policy of
retaliation law, and with broader concerns about judicial credibility and
consistency. Courts have a special responsibility to care about the
retaliation harm threshold because the discrimination doctrine they
created largely contributed to current practices encouraging and
sometimes requiring workers to complain about discrimination.
A. The De Minimis Standard
As noted above, there are three main inquiries in a retaliation claim:
whether the worker engaged in protected activity, whether the worker
suffered an adverse action, and whether there is a causal connection
between the two. This Section argues for two important shifts in the way
courts approach the adverse action requirement.
First, courts should enshrine cautionary language within the
retaliation harm doctrine warning that the harm standard should not be
onerous. If the purpose of retaliation law is to prevent actions that would
dissuade workers from complaining, this Article (as well as some jury
decisions and judicial opinions) shows that much of the current case law
sets the standard too high.
Second, courts should clarify that any action that is more than de
minimis meets the harm threshold as a matter of law. The courts should
stop trying to navigate whether non-de minimis harms are cognizable in
specific circumstances. When a court asks whether the consequence
would dissuade a reasonable person from filing a discrimination
complaint, it should assume that most negative consequences would meet
this threshold.
Of course, some conduct would qualify as de minimis. In these
instances, the worker would still have the opportunity to prove that in his
circumstances, the action caused material harm. Assuming that the
worker presents evidence supporting a material dispute of fact regarding
whether the action was de minimis in his particular case, summary
judgment would be inappropriate on the harm element of the retaliation
claim. Only in this small subset of de minimis cases should a jury
determine whether potentially actionable conduct does indeed meet the
harm threshold given the relevant circumstances in the underlying case.
Redescribing the harm inquiry in this way comports best with the
underlying goals of retaliation law. Courts already do this for some
consequences. For example, if a worker claims that her employer fires
her because she complained, courts do not determine whether termination
counts as a harm in the plaintiff’s work environment and in her personal
circumstances. Courts assume that in all circumstances a termination
would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. The results of this
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Article’s survey show that courts should assume that a much wider swath
of conduct would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining in
all circumstances. Therefore, in most cases, courts need not consider the
subjective characteristics of the individual employee.
This change does not require the courts to ignore Burlington, but it
does require some clarification about the way the Supreme Court
described the underlying inquiry. Ms. White met the harm threshold in
Burlington because any objective worker would perceive what happened
to her change in job responsibilities as negative and as being a
punishment for complaining.208 This is especially true when considering
both the change in her job responsibilities and the unpaid suspension.
This finding does not and should not depend on examining Ms. White’s
particular subjective circumstances.
However, the Court was correct to worry about providing a list of
actions that counted as retaliation and actions that would not.209 In
essence, the Court was worried about the “bad man” problem.210 If it
provided a list of retaliatory actions and a list of non-retaliatory actions,
unscrupulous employers or supervisors could protect themselves from
liability by refraining from the retaliatory actions and punishing
employees through other “non-retaliatory” actions to cause employees
distress. This would circumvent the underlying law.
For example, assume that after a discrimination complaint a
supervisor changes a worker’s shift to end at 4 p.m. rather than 3 p.m. For
many workers, this change would be inconsequential and perhaps not
even a consequence that they consider to be negative. But for some
workers, such as working parents with children in school, an employer
might intend this shift change to make the worker’s life harder as a
punishment for complaining. The Burlington standard recognized that
these cases should result in liability.
This approach to the retaliation harm standard is not only most
consistent with the underlying goals of retaliation law, but it also aligns
better with the summary judgment standard and with the institutional
competence of judges and juries. As currently conceived by many lower
courts, the retaliation harm doctrine asks courts to calibrate a standard
that accurately reflects all of the current underlying goals of the
retaliation harm standard for each possible retaliatory action in each
particular workplace and for each particular worker. As discussed earlier,
this is substantively difficult given the inherent tension within the
retaliation doctrine.211

208.
209.
210.
211.

See 548 U.S. 53, 70 (2006).
Id. at 57, 69.
Id. at 69.
See supra Section IV.C.
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Burlington provides no guidance on how courts should determine
what actions would dissuade an objectively reasonable person from
complaining about discrimination. There is no available empirical
research that determines what a reasonable person would think about
every possible act of retaliation. There is very little empirical evidence
about retaliation that tests the reasonable person’s response using the
legal standard enunciated by courts. Additionally, it would be impossible
for empirical research to calibrate an accurate view of what a reasonable
person with some of the plaintiff’s characteristics and experiences would
perceive as retaliatory.
To date, courts have not had enough empirical data to make finegrained determinations about reasonableness. It is tempting to suggest
that with enough available empirical research, courts should be able to
perfectly calibrate the retaliation harm standard. Indeed, it may be
tempting to take the data from this study and make judgments about
where to specifically draw the harm threshold. However, overly specific
attempts are misguided and likely to produce unsatisfactory results.
The U.S. legal system does not currently have a procedural framework
for incorporating or evaluating empirical evidence in individual cases in
any systematic way. There is too much uncertainty in the current system
regarding how courts are to obtain the underlying data needed to evaluate
what a reasonable person would do in a particular instance, how courts
are supposed to evaluate available data, and what effect one court’s
conclusions about the data should have on future cases.212 Further, the
judicial system does not have a good mechanism for correcting judicial
findings based on incomplete or incorrect data or for incorporating more
nuanced data over time. Nor do litigants possess a clear procedural
mechanism for presenting such data.213 It also is unclear how legal
standards should respond to changes in the underlying data that might
naturally occur in the future.
For all of these reasons, using empirical data in specific cases would
be difficult. Even assuming that the retaliation harm inquiry can proceed
without empirical evidence, it is still problematic. When federal trial
courts consider issues related to the harm standard, they often do so at the
summary judgment stage. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits courts to grant summary judgment only if there is no dispute as
to any material fact and judgment as a matter of law in the moving party’s
favor is appropriate.214 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when
212. John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance
of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1721 (2008).
213. See generally id. at 39–41 (discussing difficulties that courts have with understanding
how to use social science research in discrimination class actions).
214. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
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a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient basis for ruling in
favor of the nonmoving party.215
With the current retaliation harm threshold, it is unclear whether many
courts are appropriately applying the summary judgment standard. A
court using a summary judgment record is ill-suited to identify the myriad
characteristics and circumstances that might affect a reasonable person in
the employee’s position. These include a whole host of factors, such as
the person’s age, race, sex, economic vulnerability, and status as the
family’s primary breadwinner. Further, the court has limited resources to
determine the severity of the potential action in the context of a particular
workplace. Returning to the Supreme Court’s example about a lunch
invitation, it is impossible to tell in the abstract whether a missed lunch
is trivial or whether lunch is where critical networking occurs.216
A de minimis standard avoids or diminishes these problems. It
removes the courts from the tricky business of trying to weigh many
subjective elements in each retaliation case. In a way, many current courts
have tried to take the subjective elements out of most determinations, but
they have done so at the price of making the retaliation harm threshold
too high. The de minimis standard also takes courts out of the business of
making fine-grained determinations about how objectively reasonable
workers would act in a variety of cases by assuming that most negative
circumstances meet the threshold. Courts trying to place each potential
kind of retaliatory harm along a spectrum of cognizability face an almost
impossible task.
More importantly, the de minimis standard aligns with overarching
goals of the judicial system, such as credibility and consistency.217 When
courts rule, as a matter of law, that threatening to fire a worker would not
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination,
those courts appear disingenuous. Current practice has created an
inconsistent standard with courts making facially absurd rulings about
when harm does and does not occur.
Some might argue that the reasonable person standard is a corrective,
rhetorical device designed to get courts to consider harm from a potential
victim’s perspective. This perspective-forcing element is the goal of the
rhetorical device, and it is simply irrelevant whether the law actually
approximates the view of any real people. That view of the reasonable
person inquiry makes the inquiry even more opaque in the retaliation
context and makes it impossible to determine what the court is supposed
to accomplish when making the harm determination. The de minimis
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
216. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006).
217. One risk of the de minimis standard is that courts will simply begin to characterize a
wide swath of conduct as de minimis. While recognizing this risk, the use of the de minimis
language itself makes it more difficult for courts to credibly make such an argument.
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standard better aligns judicial inquiry, judicial and procedural
competence, the underlying policy of retaliation law, and broader
concerns about judicial credibility and consistency.
B. The Courts’ Special Responsibility
Courts bear a special responsibility in correctly navigating the
difference between cognizable and non-actionable harms given their role
in requiring and incentivizing employees to complain about
discrimination. Courts have created a discrimination jurisprudence that
relies heavily on workers complaining about ongoing discrimination.
Creating a system that requires or encourages employees to complain but
that does not protect them when they do is simply unfair. Further, the
unfairness is even more pronounced when courts ensconce the harm
threshold in the language of when a reasonable person would perceive
harm.
The discrimination statutes themselves and the courts’ interpretations
of them require and incentivize complaints. In all cases, workers must
formally invoke the administrative process.218 To bring a successful
discrimination or retaliation claim, the worker must first file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC or a comparable state agency.219 If the
worker does not do this, the worker cannot successfully pursue his claim.
In some cases, the worker still works for the employer when he files the
charge of discrimination.220
If the EEOC or state agency investigates the worker’s allegations, the
worker who filed the charge must participate in the investigation.221 The
administrative agency may interview other employees at the workplace
or ask them to provide statements about the allegations.222 The employer
may also conduct a separate, internal investigation into the allegations,
interviewing the complaining worker or other employees.223 A legal
doctrine that forces workers to invoke an administrative process or to
cooperate in subsequent investigations should protect workers who
comply.
Under the current majority view, an employer could legally threaten
to fire a worker, place negative evaluations in the worker’s file, or engage
in other negative conduct because of the worker’s participation in these
218. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1) (2012).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Burlington, 548 U.S. at 61.
221. See Hébert, supra note 122, at 721 & n.48 (showing that courts would not define an
employee as acting reasonably who filed the charge but refused to participate in the investigation).
222. See Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and
the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 934–35 (2007).
223. Id.
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formal processes. Applying this harm doctrine, the courts would not
define what happened to the worker as retaliation, even if the employer
acted because of the participation in the formal process.
In some cases, court-created doctrine requires employees to complain
internally to their employer to later bring a successful claim. When the
Supreme Court decided that a worker could bring a claim for sexual
harassment under Title VII, the Court noted that the employer would not
always be liable for the harassment.224 In two subsequent cases, the Court
developed rules that require employees, in certain instances, to complain
to their employer about harassment.225 If the employee fails to complain,
she is unable to prevail on her harassment claim, even if she can show
that the employer harassed her.226
The Court held that employers are automatically liable for harassment
if an employee’s supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
the employee.227 In other instances, the employer may still face liability,
but the employer has an available affirmative defense to escape
liability.228 The employer must establish that it “exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and that
the worker “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”229
When creating this affirmative defense, the Court imported a policy
goal for Title VII that is not explicitly enshrined in the statute. The Court
stated that “Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”230 The
Court also imported into Title VII the idea of avoidable consequences—
that employees should try to avoid litigation and provide employers with
an opportunity to remedy harassment without litigation.231 The Court also
drew on the idea of deterrence, arguing that the law should encourage
employees “to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
pervasive.”232

224. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71–72 (1986).
225. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998); see also Hébert, supra note 122, at 712 (discussing the
complaint requirement).
226. See Hébert, supra note 122, at 712, 721 n.48.
227. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
228. Id.
229. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
230. Id. at 764.
231. See id.
232. Id.
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If a worker does not complain about harassment or if he fails to
participate in an employer’s investigation of his harassment claim, his
harassment claim may fail in court.233 These employer protections are not
limited to the harassment context. Employers can also use the existence
of complaint and investigation procedures to avoid punitive damages.234
These court-created doctrines provide employers with a legal
incentive to create complaint procedures, to publicize the procedures to
employees, and to encourage employee complaints. Many employers
have policies that encourage employees to complain about actions that
may not even be cognizable under the federal discrimination statutes or
that the employee may not need to first report to the employer under
federal law.235
Not only did the courts enshrine complaint procedures as an important
part of discrimination law, they also placed retaliation law at the center
of discrimination enforcement. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that “Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.”236
The Court has also stated that “the leading reason” that workers do not
complain about discrimination is the “[f]ear of retaliation.”237
Under the current system, workers must complain in certain
circumstances to later maintain a cognizable harassment claim.238 In these
and other cases, workers are told that it is preferable to complain because
this provides the employer the opportunity to fix problems without
litigation.239 The discrimination statutes provide that employers shall not
discriminate against these workers for complaining about discrimination,
and case law nominally invokes a protective reasonable person standard.
This entire structure is undermined by a growing body of case law that
defines the reasonable person unreasonably. Given the courts’ role in
creating the complaint apparatus, the courts have a special responsibility
to protect employees against adverse actions that occur because of
complaints.

233. See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 122, at 721 & n.48.
234. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
235. Brake, supra note 163, at 118.
236. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
237. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009).
238. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71–72 (1986).
239. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998).
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C. Floodgates of Litigation?
The de minimis standard does not mean that plaintiffs will always be
able to survive summary judgment or that workers will always win
retaliation cases.240 Several structural features of retaliation law limit
claims. Focusing on de minimis harms may place greater pressure on
other elements of the retaliation inquiry, especially the causation element.
The federal discrimination statutes already contain numerous
procedural and substantive provisions that limit potential claims. Before
filing suit in court, plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC or state agency within a specified time period, and then they must
file the lawsuit within a specified time period.241 Plaintiffs typically must
file a charge within either 180 or 300 days from the discriminatory act
and must file their claim in court within 90 days of receiving a right to
sue letter.242 If a plaintiff does not file the charge or lawsuit within the
required period, the claim is usually barred.243
The administrative process is ostensibly designed to reduce the
number of claims that make it to court. The EEOC or state agency
sometimes operates in an advisory role, advising workers about the scope
of the discrimination statutes.244 Sometimes potential claimants realize
that they have no claim after speaking with employees from the
administrative agency. The EEOC or the state agency also mediates
claims, sometimes after finding that the employer likely engaged in
inappropriate conduct and sometimes through voluntary mediation
between the parties.245 Administrative agencies may also find that there
is no reasonable cause for the claim.246
Other statutory provisions also limit the number of claims. Title VII
plaintiffs may only bring claims against employers who employ at least
fifteen employees.247 Additionally, the person bringing the claim must be

240. Although the de minimis standard might lead to uncertainty in some cases, fewer cases
would fall into this gray area than under current practice.
241. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1) (2012).
The requirements under the ADEA vary slightly, but they still require the filing of a charge. See
Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV23–A–D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec.
16, 2010) (discussing how Title VII requires plaintiffs to receive a right to sue letter from the
EEOC while the ADEA does not require this).
242. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1) (2012).
243. Id. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
244. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. E.E.O.C., http://eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cf
m (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
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an individual that falls within the statutory protections, such as an
employee or former employee.248
Congress also limited the relief available to employees under Title
VII. The total combined compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff
may recover under Title VII is dependent upon the number of employees
employed by the defendant.249 The highest cap, which applies to
employers with more than 500 employees, is $300,000.250 The statute
also explicitly defines the type of compensatory damages available.251
Substantive retaliation doctrine also contains limits. The worker must
establish that she engaged in protected activity.252 The statute defines the
protected activity as falling into one of two categories: opposition
conduct and participation conduct.253 Most conduct that falls within the
participation prong involves some formal type of conduct, such as
submitting a charge of discrimination to the EEOC, participating in an
EEOC investigation, or testifying as part of court proceedings.254 As
argued above, it seems especially unfair for the law to not recognize harm
if the worker formally invokes the federal statute’s administrative or court
process and is subjected to negative actions because of this activity.
The courts place additional restrictions on opposition conduct.
Opposition conduct typically refers to internal complaints to the
employer.255 Such conduct must be reasonable in its form and must be
reasonably interpreted as complaining about discrimination.256 For
example, an employee cannot hit his supervisor and claim that he was
complaining about discrimination. The worker also must have a
reasonable belief that what he is complaining about constitutes legal
discrimination.257
Most importantly, the Supreme Court recently heightened the causal
standard in Title VII retaliation cases. To prevail, a worker must establish
that her protected activity was a “but for” cause of the adverse action.258
This means that plaintiffs in Title VII retaliation cases must establish a
higher level of causation than plaintiffs in Title VII discrimination cases.

248. Id. § 2000e–2(a).
249. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
250. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
251. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
252. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 282 (2009)
(Alito, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 274 (majority opinion) (discussing opposition and participation conduct).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012).
255. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 274–75.
256. Id. at 276.
257. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001).
258. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).
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The de minimis standard will likely place more pressure on the
causation element of retaliation claims. In some of the adverse action
cases, the court seems to be concerned about whether the worker can
establish causation—the required link between the protected activity and
the adverse action. In fact, Professor Brake has argued that courts have
unnecessarily construed the protected activity element of retaliation cases
narrowly in cases where the real concern appears to be causation.259 This
same phenomenon happens in adverse action cases.
Recalibrating the current understanding of the retaliation standard
does not mean that plaintiffs will start winning cases involving trivial
harms. Courts will still have the ability to rule as a matter of law that
trivial harms are non-cognizable, subject to the worker’s ability to show
that in her particular circumstances the action was not de minimis. When
fact questions remain in these cases, juries can still determine that harm
within a specific context was not material.
CONCLUSION
As currently framed, the retaliation harm standard is problematic. It is
ostensibly designed to prohibit actions that would dissuade a reasonable
person from complaining about discrimination. Yet, the results of this
Article’s study show that the current case law does not align with this
goal. This Article’s study results also point to an inherent tension within
existing retaliation doctrine. Current retaliation law contains two
different strands: one that uses the harm standard to further the goals of
retaliation law and another that uses harm doctrine to limit the scope of
retaliation claims. Survey participants did not view these two threads as
coterminous.
The standard appears to contemplate that courts make fine-grained
determinations about whether workers suffered harm, taking into account
the subjective circumstances of both the worker and the work
environment. The resulting case law shows that courts have difficulty
navigating this complex doctrine. If courts have consistent difficulty in
navigating these questions, perhaps the law should not require them to do
so. The de minimis standard better aligns retaliation harm doctrine with
the purposes of retaliation law.
Most importantly, this Article raises questions about whether bias
explains case outcomes in the retaliation context. Additionally, it has
implications for sexual harassment law, which also relies on a reasonable
person standard to assess harm.260 To constitute sexual harassment, the
259. Brake, supra note 163, at 155.
260. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). The reasonable person concept is also used in
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employee must face actions that are severe or pervasive enough to affect
the terms and conditions of employment from the perspective of an
objectively reasonable person. Academic critiques of the outcomes in
sexual harassment cases complain that the objectively reasonable person
standard actually enshrines a male view of workplace harm.261 The
empirical work in this Article provides an important potential challenge
to this critique. Sexual harassment law may fail to represent the views of
both men and women. If this is the case, it raises important questions
about the role and implications of the reasonable person standard.

constructive discharge cases. See generally Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The
Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 316–17 (2004).
261. Because many of the critiques are decades old, it is possible that the case law
represented a male view of harm at the time, but that view has changed over time in response to
changing workplace norms.
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